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3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAARe-balancing global trade will be difficult, generating substantial protectionist pressures. To
manage these pressures, governments must maintain domestic political support for an open
world economy. This in turn requires flexible responses to national political pressures. Rigid,
unrealistic insistence on exemplary behaviour will be less fruitful than efforts at modest, fea-
sible cooperation on trade policies. Above all, governments singly and jointly need to address
the underlying macroeconomic causes of the imbalances to prevent serious trade confronta-
tions. 
The world trading system seems to have weathered the worst of the current crisis, but
serious challenges are still to come. As the world moves toward recovery, adjustment
to the new macroeconomic reality will create economic and political tensions both
within and among nations. These tensions ￿ and not the stalled Doha Round, or the
proliferation of regional agreements, or specific protectionist pressures ￿ constitute
the most serious threat to an open trading order. 
The effects of the post-crisis rebalancing on political controversies over interna-
tional economic relations are the most immediate challenges we face in the interna-
tional trade arena. As we move out of the immediate phase of recovery, the world’s
major economies face serious problems whose unfolding has important implications
for global commercial relations.
The post-crisis environment
To understand the environment we face as we emerge from the crisis, it is important
to clarify the background to the crisis itself. The ultimate cause of the current crisis
was the global macroeconomic imbalances that accumulated over the course of a
decade and more. The US, along with several other countries, ran major current
account deficits and built up large external debts. This led, as is typical in the case of
capital inflows, to an acceleration of economic activity, including a rise in the local
relative price of nontradables; in particular, it led to a boom in financial and housing
markets. External debt financing created consumption-led expansions, then booms,
then bubbles; these eventually burst.
As the deficit countries adjust, they will have to compress consumption, invest-
ment and government spending, and they will have to increase output, savings, and
government revenue. They will need to restrain wages. They will also, perforce, have
to reduce their current account deficits. Governments will thus be under substantial
pressure to reduce imports and increase exports.
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These adjustment requirements are mirrored in the surplus countries. The run-up
to the crisis was enabled by the policies of countries that had come to depend on sub-
stantial trade surpluses as their engines of growth. Many of the surplus countries’ gov-
ernments pursued explicit macroeconomic policies to encourage trade surpluses, such
as keeping their currencies artificially weak or otherwise pushing producers toward
export markets. Now that this pattern is no longer sustainable, at least to the degree
that has prevailed for the past decade, they will have to reorient their economic activ-
ities, relying more on domestic markets and less on exports.
Adjustment difficulties
Both kinds of adjustment efforts, in deficit and surplus countries, will be difficult.
Economic agents in the deficit countries, accustomed to easy credit and booming
consumption, face austerity and slow growth at home. The search for new sources of
growth will lead them to look more eagerly at export markets ￿ and to look less
favourably upon imports. In surplus countries, producers who have become accus-
tomed to easy exports and little trade competition are likely to find the internation-
al environment much less welcoming. Markets that had previously absorbed all that
they could produce are now much more constrained. At the same time, the tradi-
tional export-led economies are likely to face much less enthusiasm about openness
to their products. 
Protectionist pressures
In this context, there will be substantial domestic and international tensions over
trade policy. In deficit countries, there will be protectionist pressures to try to reduce
imports, and pressures to open foreign markets to increase exports. In surplus coun-
tries, there will be pressures from previously economically and politically dominant
exporters to maintain government support for them in the face of external hostility.
In all instances, the potential costs of adjusting to new economic conditions will cre-
ate demands for government support. 
These domestic pressures will inevitably lead to inter-state disagreements over
trade. Over the next decade, it will be a major challenge to manage these disagree-
ments. It is important to look at trade policy, and trade conflicts, as part of the broad-
er international economic terrain upon which adjustments to new conditions are tak-
ing place. 
The "re-balancing" through which the world will be going for the foreseeable future
will put serious strains on the international trading system. Some of the most power-
ful influences on world trade come from outside the narrow trade policy arena. One
such area is currency policy. The impact of monetary relations on international trade
is widely recognised; the ability of countries’ monetary policies to impose (commer-
cial) externalities on others is clear. In this context, there is a need for the major coun-
tries and international institutions to attempt to work toward a common under-
standing of how to deal with currency misalignments in a way that does not exacer-
bate underlying trade disputes (see Frieden 2009).The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences and Prospects
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Lesson from history
The historical record is particularly clear on how important currency misalignments
can be for trade policy. As Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin (2009) have recent-
ly shown, many of the protectionist measures adopted during the Great Depression
of the 1930s were responding to developments in currency markets (Eichengreen and
Irwin 2009). National producers who found themselves under substantial pressure
due to "competitive devaluations" on the part of other countries demanded, and
often received, countervailing support in the form of protectionist trade barriers. It is
easy to imagine how currency movements ￿ and in particular, the maintenance of
very weak exchange rates on the part of major surplus countries ￿ could provoke a
protectionist backlash in other countries and regions. 
Fix macro problems to avoid trade problems
This analysis suggests two important points for policy makers:
￿ First, governments singly and jointly need to address the underlying
macroeconomic causes of the crisis, and to work together to attempt to smooth
the way toward macroeconomic adjustment. 
Some of the most trying tensions in international trade relations are likely to be the
result of macroeconomic pressures, such as exchange rate misalignments; interna-
tional collaboration to address and reduce these pressures will be central to lowering
pressure on the trade regime itself. Ironically, then ￿ but not for the first time ￿ one
of the most important ways to avoid a deterioration of international trade relations
will be to pursue appropriate and collaborative macroeconomic policies.
￿ Second, given heightened political sensitivity to international trade relations,
attempts to extend or expand the rule-making features of the WTO or other
elements of the international trading system, while well-meaning and laudable,
are likely to be irrelevant at best, and harmful at worst. 
In an environment in which governments face powerful pressures to support their
exporters and import competitors, simply insisting on adherence to the rules is of lit-
tle or no avail. Governments owe their primary allegiance to their constituents, and
demands that they address domestic economic distress will always outweigh demands
to abide by international commercial obligations.
Adjustment to the aftermath of the crisis, and to the unwinding of the global
macroeconomic imbalances, will put major domestic political pressures on govern-
ments. As these pressures spill over into trade policy, a rigidly legalistic response is
likely to be counterproductive. While international legal or normative economic con-
siderations might always insist on strict compliance with WTO and other commercial
commitments as the notional first best, in the real world of political economy, insis-
tence on the ’first best’ can be a formula for disaster. Success in responding flexibly to
powerful protectionist pressures ￿ whether at the national or regional level ￿ is better
than failure at opposing them rigidly. 
When countries collapse into conflict, it is not usually out of a purposive desire to
harm their partners, but rather out of a desperate attempt to address pressing domes-
tic political demands, demands which cannot be ignored without threatening nation-28
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al social and political stability.
In these circumstances, it would be a mistake to allow the best to be the enemy of
the good. It would be counter-productive to be unyielding about abstract principles
or pre-conditions for attempts to improve cooperation among governments.
Governments facing severe domestic political constraints will find it impossible to
make sacrifices on behalf of an intangible payoff. Truly multilateral agreements and
rigorous compliance with international trade rules would be best, and highly desir-
able; but we should be prepared to settle for what governments find feasible in their
current circumstances.
The way forward
The most productive way forward is likely to be to encourage imaginative and flex-
ible policies on the part of major trading partners and international institutions. This
means:
￿ Accommodating the needs of countries facing substantial payments difficulties
as they attempt to reduce their current account deficits. 
￿ Adapting to the concerns of strongly export-oriented countries being asked to
open their markets more fully. 
In both instances, the goal should be to achieve forward motion ￿ or at least to
avoid going backwards ￿ while recognising legitimate concerns about domestic social
and political cohesion (Frieden 2009b).
Conclusions
The world is going through a difficult re-balancing, with important economic, social,
and political implications for almost all major nations. It is crucial for the world to
maintain and strengthen an integrated international trading system. But simply
insisting on playing by existing trade rules will have little impact. 
As the world moves toward recovery, it confronts important issues with profound
implications for the world’s trading system ￿ issues that risk inflaming political ten-
sions within and between countries. Governments will have to address the underly-
ing macroeconomic sources of the crisis, and build the bases for a healthier recovery
and rebalancing of the international economy. Cooperation among major govern-
ments on macroeconomic policies will go a long way toward reducing pressure on
international trade relations.
But governments will only be able to sustain their general commitment to inter-
national cooperation and economic integration if they can muster domestic political
support for an open world economy. This in turn requires a nuanced, flexible,
response to national political pressures. While uncooperative trade policies should be
identified and combated, policymakers should recognise that governments cannot
ignore their domestic constraints, but must work within them. Rigid, ultimately unre-
alistic, insistence on exemplary behaviour will be less fruitful than efforts at modest,
feasible cooperation on macroeconomic and trade policies.The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences and Prospects
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